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Reflexives and Constraints on the Borrowing of Discourse
Function: Creoles and Tahitian French*
Kieran Snyder

1 Pronouns, Anaphors, and Distributional Strangeness in
Creoles and Tahitian
This paper concerns some data from Tahitian French which pose potential
problems for previous accounts of binding phenomena (Chomsky 1981; Reinhart & Reuland 1993). Traditional accounts seek to explain the apparent com
plementary distribution between pronouns and anaphors, as shown below:
(1) a. Clint Eastwood* admires himself,/*j
b. Clint Eastwood* admires him;/,.
In several Creoles, however, anaphors and non-coreferential pronouns share

both phonetic form and syntactic distribution. The following examples are am
biguous when taken out of an appropriate discourse context:
(2)ii batlij/i

(Seselwa)

he hit him(self)

'He hit him(self)'
(3) lij fin

pandi li^

(Mauritian Creole)

he made hang him(self)

'He hanged him(self)'
(4) a* kii en.^

(Saramaccan)

he kill him(self)

'He killed him(self)'
These facts are not unexpected in Creoles, which do not typically exhibit
the full range of morphological contrasts often observed in other languages.
But, perhaps more surprisingly, similar data occur in non-creole languages

as well. In this paper I will pay particular attention to the Tahitian facts, as
illustrated in (5):
"Many people have given me helpful comments on various aspects of this paper. In
particular, I would like to acknowledge Rajesh Bhatt, Ron Kim, Jeff Lidz, Ellen Prince,

Maribel Romero, and Gillian Sankoff for their remarks and suggestions. I would also
like to thank Karai Papana and Christine Faito, the two Tahitian speakers who have
worked with me on the data discussed here. Any errors which remain are my own.

U. Penn Working Papers in Linguistics, Volume 6.1\ 1999

332

KTERAN SNYDER

(5) a. 'Ua tlahi 'oia 'iana
PST chase he

(Tahitian)

PREP-him

*He,-chased himj/j'

b. 'Ua horohoroi

*oia'iana

PST wash-repeatedly he

teiepo'ipo'i

PREP-him this morning

'He* washed him^ this morning'
In both the Creoles and Tahitian, there is also an explicitly (non)-corefer-

ential element which is interpreted unambiguously:
(6) a. Hj fin

pahdi li^

(Mauritian Creole)

he made hang him (self)

'He hanged him(self)'
b. li{ fin

pandi limemi/^

he made hang himself
'He hanged himself/*hinT

(7) a. 'Ua aroha 'oia 'iana
PST love

he

(Tahitian)

PREP-him

'He* loved him,-//
b. 'Ua aroha 'oia *iana

PST love

he

iho

PREP-him self

*Hei loved

Sometimes, as in Saramaccan, the unambiguous reference is non-reflex

ive, as shoown in (8).1
(8) a. a* kii en^

(Saramaccan)

he kill him(self)

•He killed him(self)'
b. a^ kii henj/^

he kill him-emphatic

'He killed rnM(*self)'
Further, there are some constructions in Tahitian which are inherently re

flexive; when added to these constructions, the explicitly reflexive element iho
yields another ambiguity:

'I am not aware of other languages which pattern like Saramaccan with respect
to this data. It is difficult to say why the preponderance of languages with only one
unambiguous referential form use that form to designate reflexivity.
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(9) a. 'Ua mutu

'oia('i

PST break-off he
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tetipi)

(with a knife)

'He* cut himself^ with a knife.'
b. 'Ua mutu

'oiaiho('i

PST break-off he

tetipi)

self (with a knife)

i. 'He HIMSELF cut himself (with a knife). (No one else was respon

sible.)* or
ii. 'He cut HIMSELF (with a knife). (No one else was cut.)'
Tahitian French shows a similar ambiguity which is not present in Stan
dard or Canadian French. Standard French permits the first gloss of (10,1 lb)

but not the second; as illustrated below, Tahitian French allows both:
(10) a. Nous nous sommes mane's
We

us

are

married

'We married each other*

b. Nous nous sommes maries nous-memes
We

us

are

married ourselves

i. 'We married each other ourselves (we performed our own marriage
ceremony)' or

ii. 'We married EACH OTHER (and no one else; we are not polygamists)'
(11) a. Je me suis brossee les dents
I

me am brushed the teeth

'I brushed my teeth*

b. Je me suis brossee les dents moi-meme
I

me am brushed the teeth myself

i. *I brushed my teeth myself (no one else was responsible)* or
ii. 'I brushed my own teeth (and no one else's)'
My eventual goal is to reconcile the above facts with some version of the
binding theory. To this end, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
I will begin with a brief reminder of the binding proposals put forth by Chom

sky (1981) and the more recent account by Reinhart & Reuland (1993). I will
suggest a way to extend the version of the binding theory defended by Reinhart

& Reuland to account for the Tahitian and Creole facts; the minor modification
of their story which is required draws from corroborating evidence from Kannada reported in Lidz (1998). Finally, I will discuss the Tahitian French data

in greater detail and ultimately I will suggest that the facts follow from the
modified account of Reinhart & Reuland plus a Tahitian French information
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packaging mechanism which is inherited directly from Tahitian. In the spirit
of Prince (1992), this view has consequences for the borrowing of discourse
function across linguistic boundaries more generally.

2 Binding Theory: Syntactic Accounts
The standard formulation of the binding conditions entails strict complemen
tarity between pronouns and anaphors, as the relevant conditions (A and B)
are the strict mirror image of one another (Chomsky 1981):
(12) a. Condition A: An anaphor is free in its governing category,
b. Condition B: A pronoun is free in its governing category.
These conditions as stated above are adequate to cover many contexts
where a pronoun is disallowed in an environment permitting an anaphor and
vice versa:

(13) a. Davidj criticized himselfi/*himj.
b. David* talks to himselfi/*himj.

c. Davidj said hei/*himselfi would be there.

However, as Reinhart & Reuland (among others) note, there are well-

known contexts where this complementarity breaks down, most notably with
adjuncts and NP anaphora. The following examples allow the use of cither an
anaphor or a pronoun:

(14) a. Stella* saw a snake near herj/herselfj.

b. Ij counted seven criminals in the room apart from mei/myself,-.
(15) a. Dominic* saw a picture of himselfj/himj hanging in the hall.
b. DominiCi tells jokes about himself,/himi to entertain his guests.
Noting these problems with the standard account, Reinhart & Reuland

(1993) (henceforth R&R) propose a binding theory of their own. I will briefly
sketch their account here; for further detail the reader is advised to check Rein
hart & Reuland (1993) and the references therein.
R&R crucially distinguish between a reflexive semantic predicate and a
reflexively-marked syntactic predicate.

A semantic predicate is reflexive if

and only of two of its arguments are co-indexed; a syntactic predicate P is
reflexive-marked if and only if either P is lexically reflexive or one of P's
arguments is a SELF-anaphor. Let's see a few examples to make the terms
more clear:

REFLEXIVES AND CONSTRAINTS ON BORROWING
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(16) a. John* likes himselfj

b. semantic predicate: likes(j, j) -¥ reflexive
c. syntactic predicate: SELF-anaphor -> reflexive-marked

(17) a. *Meredithj hugged her^
b. semantic predicate: hugged(m, m) -»■ reflexive
c. syntactic predicate: no SELF-anaphor; verbal complex is not lexically
reflexive -¥ not reflexive-marked
(18) a. Raffles* kidnapped mm,

b. semantic predicate: kidnapped(r, j) -> not reflexive

c. syntactic predicate: no SELF-anaphor; verbal complex is not lexically
reflexive -> not reflexive-marked
(19) a. *Ii knew himself;

b. semantic predicate: knew(i, j) ~* not reflexive
c. syntactic predicate: SELF-anaphor ->■ reflexive-marked
In English, reflexive-marking is typically accomplished via the presence
of a SELF-anaphor, but this need not be the case. Romance languages, for in

stance, frequently express reflexive-marking via a lexically reflexive predicate
(i.e. a verbal complex which is explicitly marked as reflexive).
R&R take advantage of the distinction between semantic and syntactic

predicates in redefining Binding Conditions A and B:
(20) a. Condition A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate has to be reflex
ive,

b. Condition B: A reflexive semantic predicate has to be reflexive-marked.
These are understood as conditional statements, abbreviated as above for
reasons of perspicuity.

These conditions apply to the above examples as follows: (16) is both
reflexive and reflexive-marked, so both conditions are satisfied. (17) is reflex

ive but not reflexive-marked; hence, Condition B is violated. (18) is neither
reflexive nor reflexive-marked, so the binding conditions do not apply (the an
tecedents of the conditions are false). Finally, (19) is reflexive-marked but not
reflexive; hence, Condition A is violated.

3 Problematic Data
The Creole and Tahitian data presented in the first section of this paper is
problematic for any account couched in overt syntactic distribution.

And
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the data presented is hardly anomalous; similar facts are seen in Spanishand Portuguese-based creoles in addition to the French-based creoles shown
above. Descriptively, the problem is clear: in Tahitian and the creole languages described, there is one morphologically neutral form which is ambiguous. One subset of these languages contains an additional form which is explicitly marked as reflexive (illustrated in (6-7) above). Another subset of these
languages has, in addition to the morphologically neutral ambiguous form, a
separate emphatic form which forces a non-reflexive interpretation (shown in
(8) above). 2
On the surface the morphologically neutral ambiguous data is problematic for both Chomsky (1981) and R&R (1993), and indeed, for any account
couched in overt syntactic distribution. If there is no way to distinguish between reflexive and non-coreferential pronominal forms in the surface syntax
- that is, if they share identical syntactic distributions and phonetic realizations - how do we instantiate Conditions A and B? Clearly some theory of
use must account for speakers' ability to differentiate between the pronominal
and the reflexive forms, but this theory of use has no place in the syntax per
se. Further, how do we account for data from Saramaccan and similar creoles,
in which it is not reflexivity which is marked at all but rather something like
unreflexivity?

3.1 Reflexive-marking?
To sum, the creole data is at first blush highly problematic for Chomsky (1981)
and Reinhart & Reuland (1993) in the following respect: it is difficult to see
how one might give a syntactic account of the difference between reflexive
anaphors and non-coreferential pronouns when there seems to be a difference
in neither their syntactic distribution nor the phonetic realization of the predicates containing them. R&R's account depends crucially on the notion of
reflexive-marking, but as we have seen, reflexives are not overtly marked in
the creole data.
However, we would clearly like to maintain the distinction between reflexive anaphors and non-coreferential pronouns; despite the fact that they appear
identical in the surface syntax (ignoring for the moment the non-ambiguous
cases which are identifiably reflexive or non-reflexive, shown in (6-8)), reflexives and non-coreferential pronouns clearly mean different things. As far as
2

The account presented here does not rule out the possible existence of a language
containing both explicit forms in addition to the morphologically neutral ambiguous
form, although at present the author does not know of a language exhibiting the relevant
data.
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I can tell, there are two major avenues one might pursue in accounting for
this data. First, one might try to claim that the different 'meanings* in fact

merely correspond to different pragmatic uses. If we follow this path, we are
committed to the position that there is no ambiguity per se; that is, there is
no ambiguity represented in the syntax or semantics at any level of abstrac
tion. Intuitively, this option is unappealing, because we certainly don't wish

to advance the same claim about other languages which overtly differentiate
between reflexives and non-reflexive pronominals, and we would like our ac

count to be as cross-linguistically far-reaching as possible.
Alternatively, we might claim that the difference between the two, though
driven by a theory of use, is not strictly due to it. That is, the theory of use
allows for the choice between distinct syntactic options, and the difference in

meaning is somehow represented in the syntactic representation. As it allows
us to preserve what is good about R&R's analysis, and as it allows for widerreaching cross-linguistic claims than the first path sketched above, this is the
avenue I will pursue here.

We know that reflexive-marking may be accomplished in two ways, via

the presence of a SELF-anaphor or through lexical reflexivity, whereby a predi
cate is marked with the reflexive property. If we assume that reflexive-marking
is present in the overt syntax (as either a SELF-anaphor or a verbal complex of

the appropriate morphological type), the Creole data appears troublesome as
follows: Condition B is never met, and Condition A never applies. But let's
suppose instead that reflexive-marking does not have to be present in the overt
syntax, but rather reflexive-marking may occur via some null operator. Cre

oles are on the whole morphologically simplified; when the operator applies,

the syntactic predicate is reflexive-marked with no phonetic reflex. That is, the
marking is not present in the overt syntax even where it has applied due to the
morphological restrictions typically imposed by Creole grammars.

4 Not All Markers are Created Equal
The two instantiations of reflexive-marking are treated as semantic equiva

lents in the R&R framework; however reflexive-marking is achieved, it must
correspond to semantic reflexivity. Because binding theory applies at LF, all
reflexive predicates have the same LF interpretation. Lidz (1998) reports data

from Kannada which cast considerable doubt on this supposed equivalence.
Kannada represents lexical reflexivity morphologically, with an overt verbal
affix. In Kannada, the anaphor tannu cannot be bound by a coargument in the
absence of the verbal reflexive morpheme -koL {-koND in the past tense).
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(21) a. *Hari tann-annu hoDe-d-a
Hari

(Kannada)

self-ACC hit-PST-3.sg.m

'Hari hit himself

b. Hari tann-annu hoDe-du-koND-a
Hari self-ACC hit-PP-REFL.PST3.sg.m

'Hari hit himself
Kannada also has a morphologically complex anaphor which can occur in
the absence of the verbal reflexive:
(22) Hari tann-annu-taane hoDe-d-a
Hari self-ACC-self

hit-PST-3.sg.rn

'Hari hit himself.'

Thus, lexical reflexivity is morphologically represented by an affix on the
verb, while syntactic reflexivity is marked with a morphologically complex

SELF-anaphor. Kannada not only provides evidence of distinct morphological
realizations of the two types of marking; there is also evidence of differences

in their meaning:
(23) a. Hari tann-annu nod-i-koND-a

Hari self-ACC see-PP-REFL-PST-3.sg.m
'Hari saw himself (=own self)'
b. Hari tann-annu-tanne nod-id-a

Hari self-ACC-self

see-PST-3.sg.m

'Hari saw himself (=statue or own self)'
The first example above licenses only the interpretation where Hari is

seeing his literal self (say, in a mirror), while the second is felicitously uttered
when Hari walks past Madame Tussaud's and catches sight of a statue of him
self in the window. Using this data, Lidz suggests the following distinction:

(24) a. (Semantic/Pure-reflexive): Xx [P(x,x)]
b. (Near-reflexive): \x [P(x, fix))]
The Pure-reflexive is represented by a function which maps an object to

the object itself; the Near-reflexive maps an object to some appropriate rep
resentation of that object.

Clearly, then, all interpretations permitted by a

felicitous use of the Pure-reflexive are also licensed by a felicitous use of
the Near-reflexive (but not vice versa). In Kannada, the use of the morpho
logically complex SELF-anaphor permits both Near-reflexive interpretations,
while lexical reflexivity denotes Pure-reflexivity.
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But Tahitian has neither the morphological affix of Kannada to designate
lexical reflexivity, nor the simplex-complex anaphor distinction; there is only

one explicit anaphor, iho. But if we assume, as suggested above, that lexical
reflexivity may apply via some null operator, the picture clarifies. In Tahitian,
like Kannada, the two kinds of reflexive-marking also differ with respect to the

availability of Near- and Pure-reflexive readings. However, unlike Kannada,
lexical reflexives allow both readings, while syntactic reflexivity permits only
the Pure-reflexive interpretation:
(25) a. *Ua 'ite 'oia 'iana
PST see he

PREP-him

'He saw himself (=statue or self)'
b. 'Ua *ite 'oia iho 'iana
PST see he

self PREP-him

*He himself saw himself (=statue or self)'
c. 'Ua 'ite 'oia 'iana
PST see he

iho

PREP-him self

'He saw HIMSELF (=self)'
The pairing of morphological type of reflexive-marker with semantic type

of reflexivity does not appear to be cross-linguistically straightforward. What
is crucial here, however, is that in light of this data, R&R cannot assume that

all types of reflexive-marking are created semantically equal.

5 Borrowing of Discourse Function across Linguistic

Boundaries
Recall the following data:
(26) a. 'Ua aroha'oia'iana

PST love

he

PREP-him

'He* loved himi/j*
b. *Ua aroha 'oia 'iana

PST love

he

'He,- loved himself*/^'
(27) a. 'Ua hahu vauiho 'iana
PST shave I

iho

PREP-him self

self him

'I myself shaved him'
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b. 'Ua hahu vau 'iana iho
PSTshavel

him

self

'I shaved HIM'

c. *Ua hahu vau iho
PSTshavel

self

*I MYSELF shaved (myself) (i.e. No one else was responsible)' or
'I shaved MYSELF (i.e. No one else was shaved)'

Note that iho serves an emphatic pronoun function in non-reflexive con
texts:

(28) a. Te

ha'api'inei

PRES teach

Si'onei

here-now John

eta'atamana

to a man

powerful

4John teaches a powerful man'
b. Te

ha'api'inei

PRES teach

Si'oneiho i

here-now John

eta'atamana

self to a man

powerful

*John himself teaches a powerful man'
(29) a. 'Ua ite

au'iana

PSTknowl

PREP-him

4I knew him'

b. 'Ua ite

auiho 'iana

PSTknowl

self PREP-him

'I myself knew him'

c. 'Ua ite

au 'iana

PSTknowl

iho

PREP-him self

'I knew him himself,' i.e. 'I knew HIM'

These apparently mystifying facts are in fact quite easily explained in light
of the standard emphatic use of iho. Since iho may be added to either subject
or object in the non-reflexive case, I assume that the ambiguity illustrated in
(numberc) is related to the fact that the object may be suppressed on the in
herent reflexive interpretation. That is, iho is where it always is. Given that
it follows the subject, the agent-emphasis reading is available as usual. How
ever, if the object were present, it would intervene between the subject and
iho. And in fact the object may be present, even on a reflexive reading:
(30) 'Ua hahu 'oia 'iana
PST shave he

iho

PREP-him self

'He shaved HIMSELF'
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Standard French allows both reflexive-marking 'slots' to be filled overtly,

but to only one semantic effect:
(31) Nous nous sommes mane's nous-memes
We

a.

us

are

married ourselves

*We married each other ourselves (we performed our own marriage

ceremony).*

b. *'We married EACH OTHER (emphatic)/

Tahitian French permits both interpretations of (31), but its surface syntax
is identical to that of Standard French.

That is, the two reflexive-marking

operators can potentially apply overtly (i.e. they are morphologically realized)
in both Standard French and Tahitian French. Tahitian French then retains the
syntax of Standard French - in which both types of reflexive-marking may
appear in the overt syntax - but takes (a crucial aspect of) the information
structure of Tahitian: where Tahitian displays ambiguity in the use of the SELFanaphor, so does Tahitian French.

This is consistent with the claims put forth by Prince (1992) with respect
to constructions and the borrowing of discourse function in language contact
situations.

The speaker of Tahitian learning French has at her disposal an

overtly reflexive SELF-anaphor which can be used for two informational pur

poses: agentivity or emphasis, as discussed above. She hears an overt SELFanaphor in French, which she takes to be the same (or highly similar). In all

cases where she hears this SELF-anaphor, it is being used agentively. That is,
the evidence she hears is entirely consistent with her own pattern of use in
Tahitian, as she too can use SELF-anaphors agentively. The Tahitian learner
of French then extends the perceived parallelism and uses the French SELFanaphor as she would use the apparently comparable element in Tahitian that is, she will use the French SELF-anaphor not only to convey its canonical

agentive function, but also to express the emphatic function common to the
similar SELF-anaphor in Tahitian.
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